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ABSTRACT 
This paper examined the practice of corporate governance in developing countries, and specifically in Africa. To 
carry out the exercise, the efficacy of corporate governance mechanisms and legal (legislation) framework were 
examined. The paper observed a weak or non-existing compliance and/or enforcement of corporate governance 
legislation. It concludes that corporate governance in most African countries is ineffective, inefficient and has 
ultimately failed. The paper therefore, recommends that for African countries to reap the benefits of effective 
corporate governance there is the need to review existing legislations and to strengthen the enforcement mechanism 
of the regulatory institutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The experience of developed economies of the world has demonstrated a positive marriage of convenience between 
well coordinated and managed wealth and economic development. On the other hand, lack of framework to manage 
wealth continues to plague and plunge many corporate entities in many developing countries of the world and 
especially in Africa into the vicious circle of liquidation. Majority of the business entities and in particular financial 
institutions in Africa have been found to lack the ability to manage wealth by effectively developing and encouraging 
indigenous and foreign investors to stake their capital for reasonable returns. This according to Bhimani (2008) has a 
direct relationship with the need for an effective and efficient corporate governance practices. 
Corporate governance according to Sullivan (2000) covers a large number of distinct concepts and phenomena as can 
be seen from the definition adopted by Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD - 2005). 
By their definition “Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled”. 
The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different 
participants in the corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders and spells out the 
rules and procedures for making decisions in corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through 
which the company’s objectives are set, the means of attaining those objectives and the instruments for monitoring 
performance.    
From the aforementioned, it is very clear that corporate governance includes the relationship of a company with its 
stakeholders and the society; the promotion of fairness, transparency and accountability; reference to mechanisms 
that are used to “govern” (manage) and to ensure that actions taken are consistent with the interests of key 
stakeholders groups. The key points of interest in corporate governance according to Young (2003) include issues of 
transparency and accountability, the legal and regulatory environment, appropriate risk management measures, 
information flows and the responsibility of senior management and the board of directors.     
Corporate governance according to Clark (2004) is relatively a new concept to many companies in Africa. Scientific 
research on the subject matter is very scanty. However, a few academic and corporate researchers (Maisenbach, 2006; 
Padilla, 2002; Kwakwa and Nzekwu, 2003) conducted researches on it in Africa and have identified institutional, 
legal and capacity developments as pivotal to the development of corporate governance. This paper is therefore, 
designed to examine in details the practice and challenges of corporate governance in Africa. Specifically, the paper 
examines the concepts; theories and empirical frameworks of corporate governance as practiced in some selected 
African countries.    
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The term “corporate governance” has a clear origin from a Greek word “Kyberman”, meaning to steer, lead or 
govern. From the Greek usage of the word, it was adopted into the Latin language where it was referred to as 
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“gubernare” and the French version known as “governor”. It could also mean the process of decision making and a 
systemic process by which decisions may be implemented. However, corporate governance has much a different 
meaning to different organizations. 
Agbonifoh (2010) says corporate governance is all about ethical business conducts, transparency, integrity in running 
a business and about making a distinction between personal and corporate funds in the management of a company. 
Put differently, Kwakwa and Nzekwu (2003) define corporate governance as a “vital ingredient in the maintenance 
of dynamic balance between the need for order and equality in society; promoting the efficient production and 
delivery of goods and services., ensuring accountability in the house of power and the protection of human rights and 
freedoms”. Similarly, Oman (2001) defines corporate governance as the network of relationships between a 
corporation’s board of directors and members of its management team that help to define who has control over what 
issues and who makes pivotal decisions within the organisation. 
Also, Oyejide and Soyibo (2001) define corporate governance as the manner in which the power of a corporation is 
exercised in the stewardship of the corporation’s total portfolio of assets and liabilities with the objective of 
maintaining and increasing shareholders’ value and satisfaction of other stakeholders in the context of its corporate 
mission. In the opinion of Oman (2001) corporate governance is the private and public institutions practices, which 
in the economy govern the relations between corporate managers and entrepreneurs (corporate insiders) on the one 
hand, and those who invest resources in corporations, on the other.  
In all, effective governance of the modern organisation is of interest to shareholder activist, business people, business 
writers and academic scholars. One reason for this interest is the belief held by some that corporate governance is not 
real but a myth (in some organisations) and specifically its mechanisms have failed to adequately monitor and 
control top level managers’ strategic decisions. 
 
1. Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The corporate governance mechanisms consist of the internal and the external elements. 
i. Internal Mechanisms and Controls 
The internal mechanisms and controls refers to measures taken within the organisation by the owners and 
managers of the enterprises aimed at monitoring the activities of organisational players with a view to 
detecting sources of inefficiencies and taking corrective actions to accomplish organisational goals (Hitt, 
Ireland & Hoskinson, 1999). These factors relate to the board of directors, the management system and code 
of ethics. 
a. Board Structure and Performance 
The key issues in board structures which have implications for the quality of corporate governance open to a 
firm include, whether there are two tier structure; in conglomerates there may be a two tier boards with one 
board at the divisional (SUB) level and another at the corporate level. Others are the size and composition of 
the board of memberships, separation of the position of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO); the 
presence and the role of independent or otherwise of the audit committee. 
b. Management System 
The issues of interest here which impinge on the quality of corporate governance includes the existence and 
quality of internal control systems and procedures, including the internal auditing system, employee training, 
compliance monitoring and an effective whistle-blowing system. Others include reporting practices, corporate 
culture, regular review of code; remuneration disclosure in order to ensure that remuneration is tied to 
performance and balance of power. 
c. Code of Ethics  
Internal mechanisms and controls may include the existence of ethical codes of conduct that covers any 
combination of the following issues; obeying laws and regulations, prohibition of giving and receiving of 
bribes and gifts that has the capacity to influence decisions; prohibition of facilitation of payments, 
prohibition of donations to political parties, conflicts of interest, ethical and healthy business competition, 
anticompetitive practices and use of company resources. 
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ii. External Corporate Governance Mechanism and Controls 
These are the controls which external stakeholders exercise over the organisation. Some of these are: 
government regulations including those imposed by regulatory agencies, competition, media pressure, criteria 
for listing companies on the stock exchange, strong regulatory legislations that promote good governance; 
shareholders activism, takeovers and managerial labour market. 
2. Principles of Corporate Governance 
The organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published a set of principles for corporate 
governance in 1999. However, the principles were later reviewed in 2004. Though they are non-binding principles, 
they are however aimed at guiding corporate governance debate and are used as standard or benchmarks by 
regulators and corporate decision-makers alike. The April 2004 edition of the principles according to Agbonifoh 
(2010) covers the following areas:  
a. Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework (that promote transparency, efficient 
markets, rule of law and division of labour among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement 
authorities). 
b. The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions (that protect and facilities the exercise of 
shareholders’ right). 
c. The equitable treatment of shareholders. 
d. The role of stakeholders in corporate governance. 
e. Disclosure and transparency. 
f. The responsibilities of the board. 
According to Okafor (2009), these principles include but are not limited to the following: 
i. Selflessness on the part of employees, management and board members in taking decisions. 
ii. Integrity, that is, employees, management and board members should not place themselves in situations that 
will comprise them in taking decisions. 
iii. Accountability of employees, management and the board members for actions taken by them on behalf of 
the company; and  
iv. Honestly, that is, employees, management and board members should be transparent when, for example, 
they find themselves in situations of conflict of interest 
3. Problems of Corporate Governance 
The under listed are some peculiar problems associated with corporate governance. 
a. Demand for information: in order to influence the directors, the shareholders must combine with orders to 
form a significant voting group which can pose a real threat of carrying resolutions or appointing directors 
at a general meeting. 
b. Monitoring Costs: A barrier to shareholders using good information is the cost of processing it, especially to 
a small shareholder. 
c. Supply of Accounting Information: Financial accounts form, a crucial link in enabling providers of finance 
to monitor directors. Imperfections in the final reporting process cause imperfections in the effectiveness of 
corporate governance (Adepoju, 2010). 
4. Corporate Governance Legislation 
Various companies existing in Africa are regulated by companies and Allied matters laws. A good example is the 
companies and allied matters decree (CAMD) of 1990 in Nigeria laws. In such laws are the following prescribed and 
clearly stated to regulate the practice of corporate governance. 
a. Disclosure and Transparency Issues 
It provides that the directors of every company shall prepare financial statements reflecting a true and fair view of the 
operations of the company during the financial year. The financial statements must include among others, the balance 
sheet and profit and loss accounts; the sources and application of funds, giving information about the generation and 
utilization of funds; the value added statement report, the wealth created by the company during the financial year. 
The financial statement must be laid before the shareholders at the annual general meeting (AGM). These statements 
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must reach the shareholders, who must decide whether to approve or reject the financial statement at least 21 days 
before the AGM. The law also provides for the annual preparation of the directors reports. The board must give 
information about emoluments of directors including emoluments waived, pensions and compensation for loss of 
office to directors and past directors. 
b. Auditing Matters/Required Accounting and Auditing Standards 
The company law specifies that all companies must appoint at its AGM, auditor or auditors to audit the financial 
statements of the company and hold office until the next AGM. In cases where no auditors are appointed or 
re-appointed, the law empowers the directors to appoint a person to fill the vacancy. To ensure the independence of 
the auditor, the law prohibits any officer or servant of the company from being an auditor, neither can who is a 
partner or is in the employment of any office of the company nor is any person or firm that offers consistency 
services to it. The law also requires that the financial statement prepared by each company should conform to the 
accounting standards laid down by the statements of Accounting Standards issued from time to time by the 
accounting Standards Board, provided such Accounting standards do not conflict with the provision of the law. 
c. Requirement for equity ownership disclosure 
The law requires that each company must keep a register of member/ shareholders where the shares held by each 
holder is recorded as well as the amount paid or agreed to be paid. Whenever shares are sold they must also be 
recorded in the register. 
d. Disclosure on sundry issues and items 
An important issue in corporate governance relates to the requirement of the company law in relation to disclosure 
on identity, compensation, background of directors and senior managers as well as disclosure of related party 
transactions. Any change in ownership interest and values must also be updated and be made known to all 
shareholders who have a right to ask for a copy of the register, or any part thereof, albeit at a fee. 
e. Oversight Management 
The law also specifies rules and regulations for ensuring that management of companies act in the interest of 
investors and of the firms. Among these are the shareholders’ meeting which have supervisory functions over the 
companies; the requirements that financial accounts of companies be certified by external auditors; the different 
returns the companies are expected to send to regulatory agencies which have regulatory and supervisory mandate 
over the companies. 
f. Liabilities and Sanctions for Directors who fail to perform 
The AGM with its power to appoint and remove directors as well as approve their remuneration is expected to act as 
check on the performance of directors. Accordingly, directors will endeavour to bring to the AGM results that will 
win the approval and commendation of shareholders. Besides, certain sections of the company law prescribe 
penalties for erring directors and officers of the company. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The fundamental corporate governance theories range from the agency theory and expanded into the stewardship 
theory, stakeholder theory. Resources dependency theory, transaction cost theory, political theory and ethics related 
theories. These theories are briefly reviewed below: 
a. Agency theory 
Agency theory having its roots in economic theory was exposited by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and further 
developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Agency theory is defined by Hilman, Canella & Paetzold (2000) as the 
relationship between the principals, such as shareholders and agents such as the company executives and managers. 
In this theory, shareholders who are the owners or principals of the company, hires the agents to perform work. The 
principals delegate the running of the business to the directors or managers, who are the shareholders’ agents (Clarke, 
2004). The theory stipulates that the shareholders expect the agents to act and make decisions in the principal’s 
interest.  
 
European Journal of Business and Management                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.4, 2013 
 
55 
b. Stewardship theory  
This theory has its roots from psychology and sociology and is defined by Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson (1997) as 
a steward protects and maximizes shareholders wealth through firm performance because by so doing, the steward’s 
utility functions are maximized. In this perspective, stewards are company executives and managers working for the 
shareholders, protect and make profits for the shareholders. Unlike agency theory, stewardship theory stresses not on 
the perspective of individualism (Mak and Kusnadi, 2005), but rather on the role of top management as stewards, 
integrating their goals as part of the organisation. The stewardship perspective suggests that stewards are satisfied 
and motivated when organisational success is attained. 
c. Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory was embedded in the management discipline in 1970 and gradually developed by Freeman (1984). 
Wheller, Colbert & Freeman (2003) argue that stakeholder theory derived from a combination of the sociological and 
organisational disciplines. Stakeholder theory suggests that a stakeholder is “any group of individual who can affect 
or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives. Unlike agency theory in which the managers are 
working and serving for the stakeholders, stakeholders theorist suggest that managers in organization have a network 
of relationships to serve the key elements of the business survival ; which include the suppliers, employees and 
business partners. It was argued that this group of network is important to the owner-manager-employee relationship 
as in agency theory (Freeman, 1999).  
d. Resources Dependency Theory 
Whilst, the stakeholder theory focuses on relationships with many group or network for individual benefit, resources 
dependency theory concentrates on the roles of board of directors in providing access to resources needed by the firm. 
Hillman, et al (2000) contend that resource dependency theory focuses on the role that directors play in providing or 
securing essential resources to an organisation through their linkages to the external environment. 
e. Transaction Cost Theory 
This theory was first initiated by Cyert and March in 1963 and later theoretically described and exposed by 
Williamson in 1996 (Monks and Minow, 2004). Transaction cost theory was an interdisciplinary alliance of law, 
economics and organisations. The theory attempts to view the firm as an organisation comprising people with 
different views and objectives. The underlying assumption of transaction theory is that firm have become so large to 
the extent that they are in effect substitute for the market in determining the allocation of resources. In other words, 
the organisation and the structure of a firm can determine price and production. The unit of analysis in transaction 
cost theory is the transaction. Therefore, the combination of people with transaction suggests that managers are 
opportunist and arrange firm’s transactions for their selfish interest (Rwegasira, 2000).      
 
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
A study conducted in the Middle East and North Africa according to Elebute (2000) reveals that there is a significant 
relationship between corporate governance and performances of banks and other financial institutions. The study 
used data from 249 banks from 20 countries in the Middle East and North Africa regions. The corporate governance 
parameters used was ownership structure and findings were related to past researches. It was discovered that foreign 
banks are significantly better performers than all sampled groups. However, government owned banks were 
discovered to perform poorly when compared to the others.  
A similar research using ownership structure was conducted on Indian banks according to Maisenbach (2006). 
However, the performance indicators used were accounting measures, which comprised of return on assets, net 
interest margin and operating cost ratio. The outcome of the study showed that there is a significant positive 
relationship between return on assets and private ownership, but the research also showed that there is no significant 
relationship between return on assets and ownership variables. In another empirical analysis was also carried out in 
Kenya, between the relationship of corporate governance and bank performance; the outcome reveal that a 
significant relationship exist between the two variables in the study (Adepoju, 2010). 
AN OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN AFRICA 
Corporate governance has existed for centuries and has taken a stronger foothold in developed economies when 
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compared to emerging economies. However, African economies began to pay particular attention to the ideals of 
good governance in the beginning of the 1980s. According to Soyibo, et al (2002), the term good governance was 
first mentioned in a 1989 World Bank report on Sub-Saharan Africa but since the 1990s many donor agencies have 
sought the pursuit of good governance.   
Opinions however, differ on the content, boundaries and relevance of the theory of corporate governance in the 
developing countries because of the under development, unstructured and informal nature of the economies 
(Krajewski and Ritzman, 2002). However, the issues of food corporate governance cannot be overlooked in this part 
of the world because of its perceived role in development and economic prosperity.  
In line with the recent trend where most African countries have decided to formalize their economies, the clamour for 
good corporate governance has increased. Corporate governance systems have evolved in a number of developing 
African countries (Adepoju, 2010). However, Rwegasira (2000) argues that the concept of corporate governance is 
not necessarily the best solution for developing economies. This is because a number of developing countries face 
numerous problems that include unstable political regimes, low per capita incomes and diseases. Such problems 
require more elaborate solutions than simply adopting corporate governance practices in developing countries, 
especially countries in the African continent (Agbonifoh, 2010). 
This lack of research can be attributed to the fact that, for a long time, the issue of corporate governance did not 
receive adequate attention in the developing world. Okafor (2009) observes that historically the ability of managers 
to run organisations was never questioned. Consequently, there was little concern for corporate governance or 
information disclosure and transparency. That situation according to Bhimani (2001) has changed and the concept of 
corporate governance is currently acknowledged to play an important role in the management of organisations in 
developing economies. 
Mak and Kusdi (2005) argue that developing countries are often faced with a multitude of problems that include 
uncertain economies, weak legal controls, protection of investors and frequent government intervention. These 
problems make it even more necessary for developing countries to adopt effective corporate governance structures. 
The pressures of an increasingly globalised world economy, democratization, IMF/World Bank’s economic reforms 
and the recent financial scandals in the west have forced a number of developing countries to adapt the corporate 
governance ideals (Hillman et al, 2000). It has also been suggested that improved corporate governance systems can 
serve as an incentive for attracting foreign investments. In fact, it is poor economic performance and high 
international debt levels in emerging markets that forced the World Bank, IMF, and the IFC to intervene in an effort 
to improve the corporate governance systems of these markets. 
Meanwhile, a number of developing countries have embraced the corporate governance ideas. However, developing 
countries practice corporate governance models that are different from the models adopted by developed countries. 
This is partly due to the unique economic and political systems found in developing countries. Sullivan (2000) argues 
that developing countries are poorly equipped to implement the type of corporate governance found in the developed 
market economies because developing countries are characterised by state owned firms, interlocking relationships 
between governments and financial sectors, weak legal and judiciary systems and limited human resources 
capabilities. Corporate governance structures in developing countries are generally weak. 
Consequently, several measures have been suggested on how to improve such structures. Notable suggestions 
include the use of equity instead of debt for growth, increasing overall investor confidence through increased 
transparency, strengthening of capital market structures and encouraging the use of competition to improve 
performance of domestics firms. The concept of competitions as a way of encouraging improvements in productivity 
has been adopted in many parts of the world. Competitions mainly involve rewarding firms that excel in stated areas 
and they can be administered at a national level. 
CHALLENGES AND FAILURES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 
The challenges and failure of corporate governance in Africa stems from the culture of corruption and lack of 
institutional capacity to implement the codes of conduct governing corporate governance. Most company executives 
enjoy an atmosphere of lack of check and balances in the system to engage in gross misconducts since investors are 
not included in the governing structure. Policy and procedures required to ensure efficient internal controls are 
disregarded with impunity and total lack of thorough selection process of CEO and board members – round pegs in 
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square holes remain a challenge to effective corporate governance. 
The business cum shareholders’ interests is secondary to the self-interest of board members and the management. 
Limited opportunities for institutional investors and near zero interest in corporate social investments to demonstrate 
company’s sense of belongingness as evidenced in environmental pollutions are clear indications of failure of 
corporate governance. Similar to the above is the lack of managerial training and capacity development among most 
African executives to manage business risks. This according to Elebute (2000) has resulted in the huge agency costs 
and shareholders have had to shoulder several avoidable agency costs since the board of directors usually fail as a 
monitoring device to minimize agency problems. 
The recent near collapse of the Nigerian Stock Exchange Market, the merger, outright acquisition of some financial 
institutions by others are pointers to systems devoid of controls and accountability, which results in lack of 
shareholders’ interest and confidence in the operating environment. Failure of corporate governance in Africa has 
also been traced to lack of effective yardsticks to evaluate board and management processes and performance, since 
the board sub-committees required to be fully independent, especially the audit and remuneration committees are 
sometimes compromised. In some countries like Nigeria and Cameroon, the auditors/audit committees of the board 
have been singled out as abettors of fraudulent practices given their readiness to cover-up corrupt practices for 
executives in a desperate bid for kick-back and to retain the audit engagements of big clients. 
OBSERVATIONS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A number of observations have been made from the practices of corporate governance in Africa. Specifically, they 
include the following. 
Legislation relating to corporate governance and analysis of the standard of corporate governance in Africa show 
clearly that largely the institutions and the legal framework for effective corporate governance appear to be at a 
dismal level and compliance and/or enforcement appear to be weak or non-existent. 
Further, we observe that with effective corporate governance based on core values of integrity and trust (reputational 
value), companies will have competitive advantage in attracting and retaining talent and generating positive reactions 
in the marketplace. The study also observes a slow pace of operational performance in most African companies 
especially with those with poor ethical and corporate governance practices.   
Therefore, the paper concludes that corporate governance practices in most African countries are ineffective, 
inefficient and have ultimately failed. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the observation and conclusion of this paper, the under listed recommendations are suggested. 
i. Though the continuing existence of any firm is its ability to remain profitable, companies must set to make 
profit within the best possible ethical bounds.    
ii. For African countries to reap the benefits of effective corporate governance there is the need to strengthen 
the enforcement mechanism of the regulatory institutions, so also there is the need to review existing 
legislations on corporate governance to ensure that they are in line with the prevailing challenges, and 
in line with the international best practices/standards. 
iii. Policy formulators should attempt to account for the interactions between corporate governance and the 
institutional framework in different countries in Africa. The search for good practice should be based on 
an identification of what works in a particular country, to discern what broad principles can be derived 
from other countries experiences, and to examine the conditions for transferability of their practices. 
iv. Business organization should be corporately responsible by giving out financial statement and other 
relevant document that reveal their true and current well- being. Also, executives should develop 
organizational values and norms centred on improving quality in order to ensure that organizational 
goals are met.  
v. Companies should systemically ensure that all affairs that affect all stakeholders (internal and external) are 
disclosed to them in line with international best practices.   
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